Introduction
When an ogre (Owicki-GRies Extended) meets a pythia (variable) classic tales get retold: in this paper we investigate an invariance proof method for concurrent (parallel or distributed) algorithms parameterised by weak consistency models.
Different program semantics styles can be used to describe concurrent program executions, for example operational, denotational or axiomatic semantics. We introduce here a new style, that we call analytic; it is more abstract than operational models (Boudol et al. 2012) or pomsets (Brookes 2016; Grief 1975) ). In this context, we separate the individual traces of the different processes that constitute the program from the communications between processes.
Weak Consistency Models (WCMs) are seen as placing more or less restrictions on communications. WCMs are now a fixture of computing systems: for example Intel x86 or ARM processors, Nvidia graphics cards, programming languages such as C++ or OpenCL, or distributed systems such as Amazon Web Services or Microsoft's Azure. In this context, the execution of a concurrent program can be seen as an interleaving of the individual traces of the different processes that constitute the program, but the communication between processes are unlike what is prescribed by Lamport's Sequential Consistency (SC) (Lamport 1979) . Indeed the read of a shared variable may read another value than the one writ-[Copyright notice will appear here once 'preprint' option is removed.] ten by the last previous write (for example due to hardware features such as store buffers and caches).
Different consistency semantics styles can be used to describe WCMs. Operational models define abstract machines in which executions of programs are sequences of transitions made to or from formal entities modelling e.g. hardware features such as store buffers and caches. Axiomatic models abstract away from such concrete features and describe executions as relations over events modelling e.g. read or write memory accesses, and synchronisation.
We abstract our invariance proof method from the analytic semantics. Thus our method is parameterised by a WCM.
Overview of the Analytic Semantics
Our analytic semantics describes program executions as their anarchic semantics (process computations without any restriction on communications), and their communication semantics (restrictions on communication between processes). To illustrate our analytic semantics, we will use the load buffering example lb in Fig In lb, processes P0 and P1 communicate via shared variables x and y (initialised to 0 at line 0). Each process reads a variable (x at line 1 for P0, and y at line 11 for P1), then writes to the other variable (y at line 2 for P0 and x at line 12 for P1). Fig. 2 gives one of the four anarchic executions of lb. The computations of P0 and P1 are formalised by traces, viz., finite or infinite sequences of states separated by unique events.
Anarchic Semantics
States and events appear along a trace in the process execution order. Events give a semantics to instructions, for example accesses to registers or memory locations. States record a process program point, the value of local variables (registers r1 for P0 and r2 for P1) and the value of pythia variables.
A pythia variable is the unique name given to the value of a read event, e.g. x 1 for the read r 1 x = 1:r[] r1 x. Our pythia variables are different from ghost variables; ghost variables compensate for objects that do not exist in the chosen program semantics.
The read-from relation rf describes communications between processes. In Fig. 2 , the read r 1 x takes its value from the write w 12 x (so the value 1 is assigned to the pythia variable x1).
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. Contrary to operational models, the anarchic semantics does not define the coherence order i.e., the order in which the writes to a given memory location hit the shared memory, since this is part of the WCM. All possible coherence orders are a priori possible.
Communication Semantics
The communication semantics filters anarchic executions according to certain restrictions on the communication between processes (i.e., the read-from relation rf).
To apply these restrictions more easily, we abstract anarchic executions into candidate executions, where communicated values and cuts are abstracted away. A candidate execution consists of the set of events (partitioned into reads, writes-including the initialisation writes IW, tests, fences), the process execution order po (a total per process, between consecutive events on a trace), and the read-from relation rf. We use the domain-specific language cat as an example of a language to specify restrictions on communications. In cat, we can forbid the anarchic execution of lb by asking its candidate execution abstraction in Fig. 3 to satisfy the constraint irreflexive po;rf;po;rf. Thus the candidate execution of Fig. 3 should not have a reflexive sequence that alternates process execution order (po) and communications (rf). This is not the case since: r 
Invariance Semantics
We follow (Cousot and Cousot 1980) and define the invariance semantics by abstraction of the analytic semantics. The invariance semantics relates each local program point to the values of the other program points, local and pythia variables, and rf along all cuts of all executions going through that local program point. For example Scom ⇒ Sinv is invariant for lb where Sinv = (at{3} ∧ at{13}) ⇒ ¬(r1 = 1 ∧ r2 = 1) and the communication hypothesis S com = {⟨w 12 x , r 1 x ⟩, ⟨w 2 y , r 11 y ⟩} ̸ ∈ rf excludes the case of Fig. 2 and 3. The verification conditions are derived by calculational design from the analytic semantics by induction along cuts. In addition to the initialisation, sequential, and non-interference proof, the main difference with (Owicki and Gries 1976; Lamport 1977 ) is the use of pythia variables and the read-from relation rf in assertions and the communication proof showing that rf is well-formed. This proof method design methodology is independent of the considered language. We apply it to the Litmus Instruction Set Architecture (LISA) language of the herd7 tool (Alglave and Maranget 2015) 3. Overview of the Invariance Proof Method
We aim at developing correct algorithms for a wide variety of weak consistency models M0, . . . , Mn. Given an algorithm A and a consistency model M ∈ {M 0, . . . , Mn}, our method is articulated as follows-we detail each of these points in turn below, and show a graphical representation in Fig. 4 To illustrate our preamble, we use the classical mutual exclusion algorithm of Peterson (Peterson 1981) , which requires explicit synchronisation to be correct on WCMs.
Algorithm: Design and Specifications

Writing our Running Example
We give the code of Peterson in LISA in Fig. 5 . The algorithm uses two shared flags, F1 for P0 (resp. F2 for P1), indicating that P0 (resp. P1) wants to enter its critical section. The shared turn T grants priority to the other process: when T is set to 1 (resp. 2), the priority is given to P0 (resp. P1).
Let's examine P0: P0 busy-waits before entering its critical section (see the do instruction at line 3) until (see the while clause at line 6) the process P1 does not want to enter its critical section (viz., when F2=false, which in turn means R1=false thanks to the read at line 4) or if P1 has given priority to P0 by setting turn T to 1, which in turn means that R2=1 thanks to the read at line 5.
Sect. 5 details the syntax and semantics of the LISA language.
Annotations We placed a few annotations in our LISA code, to ensure the unicity of events in invariants and proofs: Figure 5: Peterson algorithm in LISA
• iteration counters: each loop is decorated with an iteration counter, e.g. i at line 3 for the first process and j at line 12: for the second process. The names (iend at line 6 and j end at 15) represent the iteration counter when exiting the loop.
• pythia variables: each read, at lines 4 and 5 for the first process, and lines 13 and 14 for the second process, is decorated with a pythia variable. A read r[] R x at line ℓ in the program, reading the variable x and placing its result into register R, is decorated with the pythia variable {❀ x n ℓ }, where n is the iteration counter (for nested loops we record all iteration counters of all surrounding loops). Fig. 6 gives an invariant specification of Peterson stating that both processes may not be simultaneously in their critical sections. • on process P0, the read at line 4 reads the value that F2 was initialised to, at line 0, so that R1 contains false. And, the read at line 5 reads from any write of T, so that R2 contains one of the values 0, 1, or 2, indifferently.
Invariant Specification Sinv
• on process P1, the read at line 13 reads from the initial value of F1 so that R3 contains false. The read at line 14 reads from 0, 11, or 2 so that R4 contains 0, 1, or 2, indifferently. In this situation (which is impossible under SC), both loop exit conditions can be true so that both processes can be simultaneously in their critical section, thus invalidating the specification Sinv . Fig. 7b illustrates another erroneous behaviour (impossible under SC): the turns are wrong, so that both processes can be simultaneously in their critical section, again invalidating the specification Sinv .
Communication Specification Scom
We express the communication scenarios of Fig. 7 as an invariant. We write the pythia triple rf ⟨x θ , ℓ, v⟩ to mean that the read event r = ℓ ′ : r[] R x {❀ x θ }, or more precisely its unique pythia variable x θ , takes its value v from evaluating the expression e of the write event w = ℓ: w[] x e to v (so ⟨w, r⟩ ∈ rf at ℓ and ℓ check that ⟨w, r⟩ ∈ rf and the local invariant at ℓ implies e = v). We define our communication specification Scom as follows:
Scom states the read-froms should yield values in the registers ensuring that both processes may not simultaneously leave their waiting loops. Thus the scenarios in Fig. 7 are impossible, and both processes cannot be simultaneously in their critical section.
Therefore, there cannot be two counters i and j such that: • PO enters its critical section at the i th iteration of its waiting loop (corresponding to the pythia variables F2 i 4 and T i 5 ) because either the read at line 4 and i th iteration (corresponding to the pythia variable F2 i 4 ) takes its value, false, from the initialisation of the variable F2 (in the prelude at line 0) or from the write to F2 at line 17; or, the read at line 5 and i th iteration (corresponding to the pythia variable T i 5 ) takes its value, 1, from the write at line 11; • P1 enters its critical section at the j th iteration of its waiting loop (corresponding to the pythia variables F1 j 13 and T j 14 ) because either the read at line 13 and j th iteration (corresponding to the pythia variable F1 j 13 ) takes its value, false, from the initialisation of the variable F1 (in the prelude at line 0) or from the write to F1 at line 8; or, the read at line 14 and j th iteration (corresponding to the pythia variable T j 14 ) takes its value, 2, from the write at line 2. Scom expresses hypotheses on the communications made by the threads of the program. S com is independent from any consistency models. S com is the weakest communication invariant since weakening any of its hypotheses provides a counter-example. Scom belongs to the abstract domain of invariants.
Our Proof Method
Recall Fig. 4 ; given an algorithm A, an invariant specification S inv , a communication specification Scom , and a WCM M we have to prove M ⇒ Sinv . Our method is articulated as follows: 1. Conditional invariance proof S com ⇒ Sinv : we prove that if the communications occur like prescribed by S com , then the processes satisfy the invariant Sinv ; 2. Inclusion proof M ⇒ Scom : we prove that the WCM M guarantees the communication hypotheses made in S com . We now detail each proof in turn.
Conditional Invariance Proof S com ⇒ Sinv
We have to prove that each process of the algorithm A satisfies the invariant S inv under the hypothesis Scom ; to do so we: 1. invent a stronger invariant S ind , which is inductive; 2. prove that Sind is indeed inductive, i.e., satisfies verification conditions implying that if it is true, it stays true after one step of computation or a communication that satisfies S com ; effectively we prove S com ⇒ Sind . 3. prove that Sind is indeed stronger than Sinv (i.e., Sind ⇒ Sinv ); From Scom ⇒ Sind and Sind ⇒ Sinv we conclude that Scom ⇒ Sinv . We now illustrate the correctness proof method on Peterson.
• An Inductive Invariant Sind , stronger than Sinv is given in Fig. 8 as local invariants (depicted in blue in curly brackets) for each program point of each process. Each local invariant attached to a program point can depend on the program state that is on registers (both the ones local to the process under scrutiny, and from other processes), pythia variables and, as in (Lamport 1977) , on the program counter of the other processes. In general the local invariants may also depend on the possible communications rf i.e., which reads may read their values from which writes (but this is not necessary in Fig. 8 since the program logic does not restricts in any way the possible communications as, e.g., would be the case for unreachable reads or writes). Following (Lamport 1977) , we use program counters so we do not need (Owicki and Gries 1976) 's shared auxiliary variables. The equivalence proof of (Cousot and Cousot 1980) shows that the auxiliary variables in (Owicki and Gries 1976) can always be chosen as local variables (i.e., registers in LISA) simulating program counters. This proof easily generalises to the WCM anarchic semantics. So we avoid the problem that "OG's auxiliary variables, in general, are unsound under weak memory because they can be used to record the exact thread interleavings and establish completeness under SC" (Lahav and Vafeiadis 2015) . Our solution, using program counters or auxiliary registers is both sound and (relatively) complete, and simpler and more general that the ghost states of (Lahav and Vafeiadis 2015; Jung et al. 2016 ).
• Sind is Inductive Under the Hypothesis Scom is decomposed into an initialisation proof that the entry invariant is true, a sequential proof that the invariants hold when executing one process sequentially, a non-interference proof when running processes concurrently, and finally a communication proof.
The novelty of our approach is in the communication proof. We must prove that if an invariant is true at some process point ℓ of a process p and a read for x θ is performed then the value received into x θ is that of a matching write. Of course only the communications allowed by the communication invariant S com and all of them have to be taken into account.
For Peterson, the invariants are true for any value carried by the pythia variables. More precisely, the read at line 4 can read from the writes at line 0, 10 or 17. The invariant at line 4 does not make any distinction on these cases and just states that some value F2 i 4 has been read and assigned to R1. Similarly the read of T at line 5 can read from the writes at line 0, 2, or 11 and the invariant just states that some value T i 5 is read and assigned to R2. The invariant of Fig. 8 holds for the anarchic semantics since no hypothesis is made on communications rf and therefore no possible communication has been forgotten.
• Sind is Stronger than Sinv Under the Hypothesis Scom : on Peterson the invariance proof does not use the communication hypothesis S com . It is however used in the mutual exclusion proof, that Sind is stronger than Sinv . We prove that (Scom ∧ Sind ) ⇒ Sinv or equivalently (Sind ∧ ¬Sinv ) ⇒ ¬Scom , as follows:
e., the invariant Sind holds at lines 7 and 16� ⇒ ¬Scom �since by taking i = iend and j = jend, we have
= 2)� Note that this calculation of Scom from the specification Sinv and the anarchic inductive invariant Sind provides a formal method to discover S com by calculational design. Scom is sufficient but also necessary, hence the weakest communication hypothesis, since for each possible case of communication excluded by S com , it is possible to find a counter-example execution of Peterson violating mutual exclusion (see Fig. 7 and 10).
WCM Specification Hcom
We have proved Scom ⇒ Sinv . To ensure that Sinv holds in the context of the consistency model M , we must prove M ⇒ S com i.e., that all the behaviours allowed by M are allowed by Scom . In general we have to consider several WCMs
To factorize the proofs ∀i ∈ [1, n] . M i ⇒ Scom , we look for a (preferably weakest else minimal) consistency specification H com that encompasses our specification Scom . We prove Hcom ⇒ Scom and then ∀i ∈ [1, n] . Mi ⇒ Hcom which are the only bits of proof that must be adapted when considering different models.
Inclusion Proof Hcom ⇒ Scom
As illustrated in Fig. 9 , the WCMs Hcom and Mi, i ∈ [1, n] belong to the domain of consistency specifications (e.g. candidate executions for cat) while Scom belongs to the different domain of invariants. The proof H com ⇒ Scom must therefore be done in the most
Set of candidate executions domain
Set of executions domain Invariant domain Figure 9 : Hierarchy of abstractions abstract domain more concrete than both of these domains, which is the semantic domain of sets of executions. Just like we derived Scom from the program specification ¬Sinv , we derive Hcom from the communication specification ¬S com . This is an abstraction since e.g. in cat shared variable names and their values are abstracted away. So, in general, Hcom will allow less behaviors that Scom and the Mi less that H com . The proof Hcom ⇒ Scom proceeds as follows:
• we build the communication scenarios corresponding to the pythia triples given in ¬S com from an anarchic invariant S a inv ; • we write a consistency specification Hcom (e.g. in cat) which will forbid each of these communication scenarios. We illustrate the proof method with Peterson ( Fig. 5 ) using S com (1 in Sect. 3.2.2), S a inv (Fig. 8) , and the consistency specification language cat which filters candidate executions.
• Building the Communication Scenarios Corresponding to the Pythia Triples for cat requires us building several candidate executions involving relations between accesses (i.e., read/write events) as follows (we illustrate on case 1 of Fig. 10 ).
• read-from rf: for each pythia triple, we depict rf in red; for example for rf ⟨F2 i 4 , 0, false⟩, we create a read-from relation between the initial write of false to the variable F2 at line 0 and the read of F2 from line 4, at the i th iteration.
• program order po: we also depict the program order edges between the accesses which are either the source or the target of a communication edge (viz., read-from and coherence). In case 1 of Fig. 10 , the po edges in purple are between the lines 1 and 4 on process P0, and lines 10 and 13 on process P0. po is irreflexive and transitive (not represented on Fig. 10 ).
The cat specification introduces additional relations:
• the coherence co (defined as with co from AllCo): we depict the coherence edges co relative to the variables that are mentioned by the pythia triples, in our case F1, F2 and T: see in case 1 of Fig. 10 the co edge in blue between the write of F1 in the prelude at line 0 and the write of F1 at line 1.
• the from-read fr (defined as fr = rf −1 ;co): we depict in brown the edges from a read relative to a variable x that is mentioned by the pythia triples to all the writes to x coming after the write read by this read; For example in case 1 of Fig Moreover, we depict relations that might not be directly expressible in cat such as in cases 6 and 7 of Fig. 10: • the cut relations linking events in different processes that may appear on the same cut during a program execution. In Fig. 10 , each case has a reason written underneath for being rejected. This is for example a reflexive sequence that our cat specification Hcom will forbid. Before detailing how we write Hcom in cat, we give a glimpse of the cat language.
• The cat Language ) is a domain specific language to describe consistency models by constraining candidate executions ⟨e, po, rf, IW⟩, which gather • events e, giving a semantics to instructions; Events e are partitionned into the set W of writes (including initial writes IW), the set R of reads, F of fences, B of tests; • the program order po, relating accesses in their order of execution (which is the program order in the original LISA program); • the read-from rf describing a communication between a write and a read event; The language provides additional basic built-in semantics bricks:
• the relation loc relating events accessing the same variable;
• the relation ext relating events from different processes;
• operators over relations, such as intersection &, union |, inverse of a relation^-1, sequence of relations ;, transitive closure +, cartesian product *, set difference \. The cat user can define new relations using let or with...from..., and declare constraints over relations r, such irreflexive r and acyclic r (i.e., irreflexive r+).
• Sequential Consistency in cat. Fig. 11 gives a definition of Sequential Consistency (SC) in cat. The intuition is that if e1 po e 2 then event e1 should appear on a cut before that of e2 (since instructions are executed in program order), if w rf r then the write event w should appear on a cut before that of the read event r (since it is only possible to read from past writes), if w co w ′ then the write event w should appear on a cut before that of the write event w ′ (since the write events hit the shared memory in the coherence order co), and if r fr w then the write event w should appear on a cut after that of the read event r (since otherwise the read event r has not read from the last write). If the events do not appear in this prescribed order, there will be a cycle in the disjunction of these relations, which is disallowed by acyclic. Lamport SC (Lamport 1979 ) is defined by imposing that cuts on anarchic executions (see Fig. 2 ) must satisfy the requirements illustrated in Fig. 12 that is (12a) no read on a cut can read from a write on a later cut and (12b) a read on a cut from a write on a previous cut must be from the last previous cut with such a write. Theorem SC is SC (Alglave 2010 shows that • Defining the Consistency Specification Hcom . For each case in Fig. 10 , we forbid a reflexive sequence. In cat, the specification given in Fig. 13 . irreflexive fr; po; fr; po irreflexive fr; po irreflexive co; po; fr; po irreflexive rf; po; rf; po and there are no prophecies on cuts. • Proving that All the Behaviours Allowed by Hcom are Allowed by Scom is done contrapositively i.e., ¬Scom ⇒ ¬Hcom . By ¬Scom in (1), we get ∃i, j .
which we put in disjunctive normal form and give the cases illustrated in Fig. 10 , thus proving ¬Hcom .
Consistency Proof M ⇒ Hcom
Proving that all the behaviours allowed by M = Mi, i ∈ [1, n] are allowed by Hcom is done by reductio ad absurdum in the semantic domain of the consistency specification language (e.g. candidate executions for cat). Suppose an execution of Peterson that is forbidden by H com yet allowed by M . By definition of Hcom in Fig. 13 , there are 5 cases. Each of these cases may be forbidden by the WCM M (e.g. SC) or prevented by adding fences (e.g. TSO).
• When M is SC. In cat speak, SC is modelled as given in Fig. 11 . Now, all 4 sequences required to be irreflexive by H com are included in the transitive closure of po | rf | co | fr, and rejected on SC. Moreover, Lamport's SC has no prophecies on cuts, thus excluding cases 6 and 7 in Fig. 10 .
• Adding Labelled Fences (in Case of No Prophecy beyond Cuts).
Some WCMs (like those weaker than TSO) authorise the reordering of writes and reads on different shared variables. In this case, the restrictions of H com in Fig. 13 are not satisfied and Peterson is incorrect. In the case where there are no prophecies on cuts, the solution is to add labelled fences as in Fig. 14. (which can be placed anywhere in the process, e.g. before the second label). The specification of the fence is let fre = (rf^-1 ; co) & ext let rfe = rf & ext let fence = fromto(tag2events('br)) irreflexive fre;fence;fre;fence irreflexive rfe;fence;rfe;fence irreflexive co;fence;fre;fence In the invariance proof, fences are skip so the proof is unchanged. The fence semantics must be defined by a cat specification (F is the set of fence events) and Hcom strengthened as shown in Fig. 14 . This implies the consistency specification of H com for Peterson algorithm in Fig. 13 since fence ⊆ po.
• When M is TSO. In cat, TSO is modeled as in Fig. 15 (omitting no-prophecy beyond cuts). The difference with SC in Fig. 11 let po-loc = po & loc acyclic po-loc | rf | co | fr as scpv let ppo = po \ (W*R) acyclic ppo | rfe | co | fr as tso Figure 15 : TSO in cat is that w po r is required if the write event w and the read event r refer to the same variable (as required by scpv, see the intersection with the relation loc). Else, it is not required on different variables as shown by tso (using the relation ppo (for preserved program order) as the program order po relieved from (see the setminus operator \) the write-read pairs (W*R)).
Thus certain executions forbidden by our specification Hcom of Peterson (see Fig. 13 ) will not be forbidden by the TSO model given in Fig. 15 . Indeed all the executions that contain a sequence fr; po; fr; po forbidden by our specification of Peterson involves a pair write-read in program order. These write-read pairs are explicitly removed from the tso acyclicity check of Fig. 15 , thus will not contribute to executions forbidden by the model. It is therefore necessary to implement the fences of Fig. 14 . The first one between {1}/{2} and {10}/{11} is implemented naturally in TSO since write-write pairs cannot be reordered with respect to po. The second labelised fence between 2/4 and 11/13 can be implemented by mfence in x86.
• In Presence of Prophecy Beyond Cuts, e.g. in LISA, implementing a spinlock where the busy waiting can anticipate the lock release is incorrect. So we introduce a synchronisation marker at the beginning of both critical sections, as shown in Fig. 16 , to prevent such prophecies beyond cuts.
The specification of the synchronisation marker is (see Fig. 12a 
Related Works on Invariance Proof for WCM
Previous attempts to generalise (Owicki and Gries 1976 ) from SC to WCMs are not parameterised by the WCM. Our formal specification of the WCM parameter takes the form of the communication specification Scom , shown to be implied by the consistency specification Hcom (e.g. in cat) itself implied by an architectural consistency specification M (e.g. (Shasha and Snir 1988; Alglave 2010; Alglave et al. 2016) ). These constraints S com hence Hcom are on communications only, in contrast to constraints on the execution order and the visibility of writes (Crary and Sullivan 2015) or the ordering between commands of (Bornat et al. 2015) .
Our method deals with WCMs without getting back to the world of SC. This is in contrast to previous methods exposing the store buffers in the program states (e.g. (Dan et al. 2015) ) or explicitly considering all possible reshuffles e.g. by program transformation (e.g. (Atig et al. 2011; Alglave et al. 2013; Miné 2012) ).
In the classical (Turing 1949; Naur 1966; Floyd 1967; Hoare 1969) invariance proof method, (shared) variable names are used in proofs to denote the value of the program variables. This is a severe restriction for previous invariance proof methods since in WCM there is no notion of global time hence of "the" instantaneous value of a shared variable. We solve the problem using pythia variables, based on the idea that the value of a shared variable is locally known when a read is satisfied. Pythia variables are loosely akin to the "fresh variables" used in the semantics and implementation of Prolog (Cousot et al. 2009 ). They differ from ghost variables used for behavior-preserving instrumentation of program with non-physical resources and from prophecy variables for backward reasonings (Abadi and Lamport 1991; Cousot 1981) . They are used in the herd7 tool (Alglave and Maranget 2015) .
The literature sticks to SC with communicated value naming by shared variable names through restrictions on the considered algorithm, programming language, assertion, and/or memory model. Specific restrictions on the considered algorithm are concurrent stacks (Dodds et al. 2015) , Read-Copy-Update (RCU) implementation of linked lists (Tassarotti et al. 2015) ).
Specific restrictions on the considered programming language with a specific memory model include ARM machine-code ) or a specific programming discipline such as data-race-free programs for causal memory (e.g. (Ahamad et al. 1995; Owens 2010) ), total store order with store buffer forwarding (e.g. (Cohen and Schirmer 2010) ), or coherent causal memory (e.g. (Cohen 2014) ).
Specific restrictions on the assertions mostly involve some form of abstraction (Dinsdale-Young et al. 2010; Batty et al. 2013) .
Finally, the most common restriction is on the considered specific WCM (e.g. the release-acquire fragment of the C11 memory model (Norris and Demsky 2013; Vafeiadis and Narayan 2013; Turon et al. 2014; Lahav and Vafeiadis 2015; Tassarotti et al. 2015; Doko and Vafeiadis 2016; Lahav et al. 2016 ) ((Turon et al. 2014 ) "also considers isolation / ownership transfer properties"), TSO/PSO/RMO in (Burckhardt and Musuvathi 2008; Atig et al. 2010; Wehrman and Berdine 2011; Sieczkowski et al. 2015) , the Java Memory Model in (Klebanov 2004) , a hierarchical memory model in (Barthe et al. 2008) , causal consistency in , the "relaxed" memory model in (Burckhardt et al. 2006 (Burckhardt et al. , 2007 , the RMC memory model in (Crary and Sullivan 2015) , etc.).
We don't have any of the above restrictions since the WCM is a parameter of our proof method and defines the communication relation rf explicily appearing in invariants.
The LISA Language and its Analytic Semantics
We present here the LISA language (Litmus Instruction Set Architecture) . Its vocation is purely pedagogical at the moment, with an ambition to be quite minimal. It is supported by the herd7 tool (Alglave and Maranget 2015) . To illustrate this section we will use Peterson's algorithm in Fig. 5 .
Syntax
LISA Programs P = {Pstart}�P0∥. . . ∥Pn−1� on shared variables x ∈ loc�P� contain: • a prelude Pstart assigning initial values to shared variables (0 (false) by default). In the case of Peterson algorithm in Fig. 5 , the prelude at line 0 assigns the value false to both variables F1 and F2, and the value 0 to T.
• processes P0 . . . Pn−1 in parallel; each process:
has an identifier p ∈ Pi�P� ≜ [0, n[; in the case of Peterson we have used P0 for the first process (on the left) and P1 for the second process (on the right); has local registers (e.g. R0, R1); registers are assumed to be different from one process to the next; if not we make them different by affixing the process identifier like so: (p:R)); is a sequence of instructions.
Instructions can be:
• register instructions mov R1 operation, where the operation has the shape op R2 r-value: the operator op is arithmetic (e.g. add, sub, mult) or boolean (e.g. eq, neq, gt, ge); R1 and R2 are local registers; r-value is either a local register or a constant; • read instructions r[ts] R x initiate the reading of the value of the shared variable x and write it into the local register R; • write instructions w[ts] x e initiate the writing of the value of the register expression e into the shared variable x; • branch instructions b[ts] operation lt branch to label lt if the operation has value true and go on in sequence otherwise; reads shared variable x into local register R, the register instructions reg-instrs are executed, and R is written back to x. Any semantics requirement on RMWs, such as the fact that there can be no intervening write to x between the read and the write of the RMW, has to be ensured by a cat specification. Instructions can be labelled (i.e., be preceded by a control label ℓ) to be referred to in branches or fences for example. Labels are unique; if not we make them different by affixing the process identifier like so: p:l. instr�P� pℓ is the instruction at label ℓ ∈ L(p) of process p of program P. Moreover, instructions can bear tags ts (to model for example C++ release and acquire annotations).
Anarchic Semantics
Executions
The anarchic semantics of a parallel program is a set of executions; an execution has the form ξ = ς × π × rf ∈ Ξ, where ς is the computation, π is the cut sequence, and rf is the communication part. An example is given in Fig. 2 .
Communications are read-from pairs rf [w, r] linking a (possibly initial) write event w and a read event r relative to the same shared variable x with the same value. Communications are anarchic: we place no restriction on which write a read can read from; restrictions can be made in a WCM specification however.
Computations have the form ς = τstart × ∏ p∈Pi τp, where τstart is an execution trace of the prelude process, and τp are execution traces of the processes p ∈ Pi. A finite (resp. infinite) non-empty trace τp, p ∈ Pi ∪ {start} is a finite (resp. infinite) sequence
(with τp k an event and τp k the next state-see below for the definitions of event and state) such that τp 0 = ϵstart is the start event (not represented in Fig. 2) , |τ p| ≜ m ∈ N * for finite traces and |τp| ≜ m = ω = 1 + ω for infinite traces where ω is the first infinite limit ordinal so that [0, 1 + ω[ = [0, ω[ = N. Abstracting away the cut sequence π, we get a true parallelism semantics since there is a notion of local time in each trace τ p, p ∈ Pi ∪ {start} of an execution ξ = τstart × ∏ p∈Pi τp × rf but no global time, since it is impossible to state that an event of a process happens before or after an event of another process or when communications in rf do happen.
Events indicate several things:
• their nature, e.g. read (r), write (w), branch (b), fence (f), etc.;
• the identifier p of the process that they come from;
• the control label ℓ of the instruction that they come from;
• the instruction that they come from-which gives the shared variables and local registers affected by the event, if any, e.g. x and R in the case of a read r[ts] R x; • their stamp θ ∈ T(p); they ensure that events in a trace are unique. In our examples, stamps gather the control label and iteration counters of all surrounding loops, but this is not mandatory: all we need is for events to be uniquely stamped. Different processes have non-comparable stamps. Stamps are totally ordered per process by ✁p (which is irreflexive and transitive, while events on different processes are different and incomparable). The successor function succ p is s.t. θ ✁p succp(θ) (but not necessarily the immediate successor); infp is a minimal stamp for process p. We consider executions up to the isomorphic orderpreserving renaming ∼ = of stamps; • their value v ∈ D, whether ground or symbolic (for writes. as in symbolic execution). To identify the ground or symbolic values that are communicated in invariants, we use pythia variables P(p) ≜ {x θ | x ∈ X ∧ θ ∈ T(p)} (note that the uniqueness of stamps on traces ensures the uniqueness of pythia variables for reads). More precisely, traditional methods such as Lamport's and Owicki-Gries' name x the value of the shared variable x, but we cannot use the same idea in the context of weak consistency models. Instead we name x θ the value of shared variable x read at local time θ.
The events τp on a trace τp of process p are (e.g. Fig. 10 States σ = s⟨ℓ, θ, ρ, ν⟩ of a process p mention:
• ℓ, the current control label of process p (we have done�P�(p)ℓ which is true if and only if ℓ is the last label of process p which is reached when process p does terminate); • θ is the stamp of the state in process p;
• ρ is an environment mapping the local registers R of process p to their ground or symbolic value ρ(R); • ν is a valuation mapping the pythia variables x θ ∈ P(p) of a process p to their ground or symbolic value ν(x θ ). This is a partial map since the pythia variables (i.e., the domain dom(ν) of the valuation ν) augment as communications unravel. Values can be ground, or symbolic expressions over pythia variables. The prelude process has no state (represented by •).
Sequence of Cuts
⟩ of pairs of events and states of trace τp, p ∈ Pi. A cut records the point each process has reached in its computation. A well-formed sequence of cuts records an interleaving of computation steps.
Well-formedness Conditions
We specify our anarchic semantics by the means of well-formedness conditions over executions ξ = ς × π × rf ∈ Ξ.
Conditions over Computations ς= τstart × ∏ p∈Pi τp are as follows: • Start: traces τ must all start with a unique fake start event ϵstart:
Wf 2 (ξ) • Uniqueness: the stamps of events must be unique:
Wf 3 (ξ) It immediately follows that events of a trace are unique, and the pythia variable x θ in any read r(⟨p, ℓ, r := x, θ⟩, x θ ) is unique.
• Initialisation: all shared variables x are initialised once and only once to a value v x in the prelude (or to vx = 0 by default).
Wf 4 (ξ) • Maximality: a finite trace τp of a process p must be maximal i.e., must describe a process whose execution is finished. Note that infinite traces are maximal by definition, hence need not be included in the following maximality condition:
i.e., the control state of the last state of the trace is at the end of the process, as indicated by done�P�(p)ℓ.
Conditions over the Cut Sequence π of a computation ς = τstart × ∏ p∈Pi τp are as follows:
•
Step: But for the final cut, if any, the next cut follows from a computation step.
k i,q < |τq| then ∃q ∈ Pi such that ki,q + 1 ⩽ |τq| and
Conditions over the Communications rf are as follows:
• Satisfaction: a read has at least one communication in rf:
Wf 8 (ξ)
• Singleness: a read event in the trace τp must have at most one corresponding communication in rf:
Note however that a read instruction can be repeated in a program loop and may give rise to several executions of this instruction, each recorded by a unique read event.
• Match: if a read reads from a write, then the variables read and written must be the same:
Wf 10 (ξ) • Inception: no communication is possible without the occurrence of both the read and (maybe initial) write it involves:
. Note that this does not prevent a read to read from a future write.
Language-dependent Conditions for LISA are as follows:
• Start: the initial state of a trace τp should be of the form:
where l 0 p is the entry label of process p and infp is a minimal stamp of p.
• Next state: if at point k of a trace τp of process p of an execution ξ = τ start × ∏ p∈Pi τp × π × rf the computation is in state τp k−1 = s⟨ℓ, θ, ρ, ν⟩ then: the next event must be generated by the instruction instr ≜ instr�P�pℓ at label ℓ of process p the next event has the form τp k = e⟨⟨p, ℓ, instr, θ⟩, x θ , v⟩ the next state τp
′ which is the label after the instruction instr the stamp θ ′ = succp(θ) is larger, and the value v as well as the new environment ρ ′ and valuation ν ′ are computed as a function of the previous environment ρ, the valuation ν, and the execution ξ.
. We give the form of the next event τp k for each LISA instruction:
. where E �e�(ρ, ν) is the evaluation of the expression e in the environment ρ and valuation ν.
• Write (instr = ℓ : w[ts] x r-value; ℓ ′ : . . .):
• Read (instr = ℓ : r[ts] R1 x; ℓ ′ : . . .):
• RMW (instr = rmw[ts] r (reg-instrs) x ): for the begin (instr = beginrmw[ts] x) and end event (instr = endrmw[ts] x):
• Test (instr = ℓ : b[ts] operation lt; ℓ ′ : . . .): on the true branch:
Anarchic Semantics
The anarchic semantics of a program P is
Theorem 1 In an execution ξ = ς × π × rf ∈ Ξ, the communication rf uniquely determines the computation ς.
Consistency Specification of a Semantics
The semantics S �Hcom � ∈ Ξ → {allowed, forbidden} of a consistency specification H com checks whether an execution ξ ∈ Ξ is allowed or forbidden by Hcom . Defining the consistency abstraction αana�Hcom �(S) ≜ {ξ ∈ S | S �Hcom �ξ = allowed}, Example 1 (cat specification) The candidate execution abstraction αΞ (ξ) abstracts the execution ξ = ς × π × rf ∈ Ξ into ⟨e, po, rf , iw ⟩ where e is the set of events in ς (partitionned into fence, read, write, . . . events), po is the program order (transitively relating successive events on a trace of each process), rf = rf is the set of communications, and iw is the set of initial write events. Then we define αΞ (S ) ≜ {⟨ξ, αΞ (ξ)⟩ | ξ ∈ S } and α �Hcom �(C ) ≜ {ξ | ∃Γ . ⟨ξ, Ξ⟩ ∈ C ∧ ⟨allowed, Γ ⟩ ∈ �Hcom �(Ξ)} where the consistence �Hcom �(Ξ) of a candidate execution Ξ for a cat consistency model H com is defined in ) and returns communication relations Γ specifying communication constraints on communication events (e.g. containing co of with co from AllCo in Hcom ). The consistency abstraction for a cat specification Hcom is then αana�Hcom � ≜ α �Hcom � • αΞ . ✷
Invariance Abstraction
The semantics S �P� of a program P is a set of executions ξ ∈ Ξ so belongs to ℘(Ξ). Representing properties by the set of elements which have this property, semantic properties P are elements of P ∈ ℘(℘(Ξ)). So P has semantic property P means S �P� ∈ P, equivalently {S �P�} ⊆ P where {S �P�} is the strongest semantic property (called collecting semantics) and ⊆ is implication. The join abstraction α ∪(P ) = ∪P such that ⟨℘(℘(Ξ)), ⊆⟩ − − − − → ← − − − − α∪ γ∪ ⟨℘(Ξ), ⊆⟩ yields execution properties P ∈ ℘(Ξ). So P has execution property P means S �P� ∈ γ∪(P ) that is {S �P�} ⊆ γ ∪(P ) equivalently α∪({S �P�}) ⊆ P i.e., S �P� ⊆ P . The strongest execution property of P is S �P�.
The invariance abstraction α inv (P ) in Fig. 17 collects states on all cuts of all traces at each control point of each process.
Figure 17: Invariance abstraction of an execution
An invariance property I ∈ I, in particular the strongest invariant α inv (S �P�) ∈ I, attaches a local invariance property Ip(ℓ) at each program point ℓ of each process p, which is a relation between the process state and the state of all other processes (including their control state) on all cuts of all executions going through point ℓ of process p. We have ⟨℘(Ξ), ⊆⟩ − − − − → ← − − − − α inv γ inv ⟨I,⊆⟩ so P has invariance property Sinv ∈ I means S �P� ∈ γ∪(γinv(Sinv )) i.e.,
Local invariants are often expressed as logical formulae S ind p (ℓ) attached to program points ℓ ∈ L(p) of each process p ∈ Pi which logical interpretation is a set-theoretic property in I. Formally, a logical assertion Sind is a logical formula Sind p (ℓ) with free variables κ0, θ0, ρ0, ν0, . . ., νp−1, θp, ρp, νp, κp+1 . . ., κn−1, θn−1, ρn−1, νn−1, and rf attached to each program point ℓ of each process p of the program (excluding κ p = ℓ).
The assertions on control are often written at p{ℓ} (or at{ℓ} if the label ℓ is unique to process p) to mean that κp = ℓ. We write atp{ℓ1, . . . , ℓm} for ∨ ℓm ℓ=ℓ 1 atp{ℓ}. Moreover the assertions on environments and valuations are expressed using assertions on registers and pythia variables. For example, ρ ∈ R is expressed by the logical formula ∀ρ ∈ R .
∧ r∈dom(ρ) r = ρ(r), or any equivalent logical formula. The initial values of shared variables is determined by the prelude (0 by default) so S ind p,ℓ states assertional properties. For relational invariance (Cousot and Cousot 1982 ) the initial value of shared variables is set to an initial pythia variable.
Sound and Complete Invariance Proof Method
Given a program P and an invariance specification Sinv , the invariance proof method consists in proving that α inv (αana�Hcom �(S a �P�)) ⊆ Sinv . The design of the invariance proof method by calculus starts as follows (⇐ is soundness and ⇒ is completeness):
(⇒) For completeness, we choose to describe exactly the communications that is
by defining the conditional invariance proof Scom ⇒ Sinv to be α inv (S a �P�)∩ Scom⊆ Sinv and the inclusion proof Hcom ⇒ Scom to be α inv (αana�Hcom �(S a �P�))⊆ Scom .
This calculation justifies the decomposition of the correctness proof in Fig. 4 into an invariance proof and an inclusion proof using an intermediate communication specification Scom .
Conditional Invariance Verification Conditions
We now present our invariance verification conditions for proving S com ⇒ Sinv , i.e., the properties that the logical assertions at each program point must satisfy to qualify as inductive invariants S ind .
Pre, Post and Communication Conditions
For each of our verification conditions, we need to define general shapes of assertions; more specifically we have: . . , xm] stipulates that A has free variables x1, . . . , xm, A[x ← e] is the substitution of e for x with renaming of quantified variables to avoid variable capture, and PRE ℓ p does not depend upon κp so the substitution [κp ← ℓ] has no effect.)
(where POST ℓ ′ p does not depend upon κp so the substitution [κp ← ℓ ′ ] has no effect.)
[rf] meaning that a read or write instruction at ℓ of process p may execute (since the invariant Sind p (ℓ)[rf] holds) and communicate according to rf (as specified by Scom p (ℓ)[rf]).
Initialisation Verification Condition
For each process p, the invariant at the entry point ℓ 0 p must be true when the other processes are also at their entry, with all registers initialised to 0 and no pythia variable:
.3 Sequential Verification Conditions
The verification conditions for the sequential proof require to prove that if the precondition inductive invariant PRE 
Non-interference Verification Conditions
The verification conditions for the non-interference proof require to prove that if the precondition inductive invariant PRE ℓ,κ p,r holds at point ℓ of process p and any other process r executes an instruction κ : instr κ ′ at label κ, goes to κ ′ , and the communication is allowed by specification Scom p , then the postcondition inductive invariant POST ℓ,κ ′ p,r at point ℓ still holds with the updated stamp, environment and valuation.
• For local side-effect free marker instructions κ : instr κ
where sat checks for satisfiability of symbolic boolean expressions or for truth of ground values. These verification conditions can be rephrased as inference rules (in an informal style "{P i}Si{Qi}, i ∈ [1, n] are interference free" (Owicki and Gries 1976) ).
Communication Verification Conditions
Assertions associated with read and write instructions must satisfy certain sanity conditions that stem from the semantics:
• All process read instructions ℓ : r[ts] R x ℓ ′ must read either from an initial or a reachable program write, allowed by the communication hypothesis (∃ ∃ ∃ P[X1, . . . , Xm] means that all free variables in predicate P but X 1, . . . , Xm are existentially quantified):
• A read event can read from only one write event. COM
• The values v allowed to be read by the communication hypothesis must originate from reachable program write instructions ℓ : w[ts] x r-value ℓ ′ : ∀rf . ∀ rf [w(⟨q, ℓq, w[ts] x r-value, θp⟩, v), r] ∈ rf .
(match) COM ℓ p [θq, ρq, νq, rf] ⇒ v = E �r-value�(ρq, νq)
• The inception condition Wf 11 (ξ) is not required since nonexistent communications can only lead to more imprecise invariants, which is sound. However, it is always possible to take inception into account to get precise invariants for completeness.
The communications taken into account in rf must include all those of the anarchic semantics as restricted by Scom (by Sect. 11) and the imprecision can only be on communicated values (including in absence of inception). Example (Thin air 1) In absence of loops, stamps are the unique program labels. We write rf ⟨x ℓp , ℓq, v⟩ for rf [w(⟨q, ℓq, w[ts] x r-value, ℓq⟩, v), r(⟨p, ℓp, r[ts] R1 x, ℓp⟩, x ℓp )] and define Γt ≜ {rf ⟨x1, 0, 0⟩, rf ⟨x1, 7, 42⟩)} × {rf ⟨y 5 , 0, 0⟩, rf ⟨y 5 , 3, 42⟩)}.
By the communication proof for any rf ∈ Γt, communicated values cannot be different (match), rf can neither be chosen to be a superset by (satisfaction) and (singleness) nor a subset (which is the subject of Sect. 11). For example, at 2, x 1 ∈ {0} is prevented by the read rule, all communicated values are readable. Values must come from writes so x1 ∈ {0, 42, 43} at 2 is prevented by (match).
In case of an unconditional branch b true 8; at 6, any rf ⟨x1, 7, -⟩ ∈ rf is prevented by (satisfaction) i.e., it is not possible to read from a non-reachable write. ✷
Invariance Proof S com ⇒ S inv
The calculation for the invariance proof Scom ⇒ Sinv , formally α inv (S a �P�)∩ Scom⊆ Sinv , goes on by induction on the length of trace prefixes, which requires the use of the inductive invariant S ind . The basis Wf 12 (ξ) yields the initialisation condition. The sequential verification condition for Sind p (ℓ) is obtained when performing a computation step Wf 13 (ξ), . . . , Wf 18 (ξ) in the current process p while the non-interference is obtained when performing a step in another process r ̸ = p. The communication proof requirements follow from Wf 8 (ξ) to Wf 11 (ξ).
This yields Th. 2 showing that the method is sound (i.e., if the verification conditions are all satisfied then the invariance statement Sinv is true for the program anarchic semantics S a �P� with communications restricted by the specification Scom ). The proof method is complete so that if an invariance statement S inv is true for the anarchic semantics S a �P� with communications restricted by the specification Scom then this can always be proved thanks to a stronger inductive invariant S ind satisfying all verification conditions.
As usual the completeness proof provides no clue on how to choose the inductive invariant S ind since it is based on the choice Sind = αinv(S a �P�)∩ Scom , i.e., the exact abstraction of the semantics which in general is not computable.
The soundness and completeness proof is set-theoretical. In practice, one uses a logic with an interpretation, and so the soundness prove is identical using the interpretation of the logical fomulae. This is a problem however for the completeness proof since, in general, S ind = α inv (S a �P�)∩ Scom cannot be expressed as a formula of the chosen logic. One can consider higher-order logics as in e.g. (Back and von Wright 1990) but they cannot be handled e.g. by SMT solvers. The usual restriction is to relative completeness under the assumption that α inv (S a �P�)∩ Scom is expressible in the logic (Cook 1978 (Cook , 1981 .
Theorem 2 (Invariance proof Scom ⇒ Sinv ) Scom ⇒ Sinv , formally α inv (S a �P�)∩ Scom⊆ S inv , if and only if there exists Sind⊆ S inv which is inductive for P, i.e., satisfies the interpretation of the initialisation (8.2), sequential (8.3), non-interference (8.4), and communication (8.5) verification conditions of Sect. 8.
The following Th. 3 supports our claim that our invariance proof method for WCM is an extension of Lamport's invariance proof method for sequential consistency.
Theorem 3 (Generalisation of Lamport proof method) The verification conditions of Th. 2 for the inductive invariant S ind reduce to (Lamport 1977) proof method for sequential consistency.
Our invariance proof method for WCM is also an extension of (Owicki and Gries 1976) for sequential consistency since, by the argument given in (Cousot and Cousot 1980) , the auxiliary variables can always be chosen as local registers (simulating program counters) so auxiliary variables need not to be shared.
Inclusion Proof
The calculation of the inclusion proof Hcom ⇒ Scom , formally α inv (αana�Hcom �(S a �P�))⊆ Scom , yields the verification conditions for the communication specification S com in Th. 4 below. Define
�def. ∈,∪,⊆, and S ana �Hcom �P so that ξ has the form ξ =
i.e., any cut of any anarchic execution history allowed by the consistency specification H com must satisfy all local invariants Scom along the cut.
So we have proved Theorem 4 (Inclusion proof) The verification conditions (20) are sound and complete for proving the inclusion Hcom ⇒ Scom .
Observe that the completeness proof of Th. 4 assumes that Hcom ⇒ Scom . If the consistency specification language is not expressive enough there might be no way to express a strong enough consistency specification H com , a source of incompleteness. This is the case e.g. of cat designed to describe architectures so that e.g. memory values are abstracted away which may not be the case in Scom . This means that the design of the program P must ensure that S com is weak enough to be implementable. Observe also that Th. 4 requires analyzing all possible executions of the program, which is seldom feasible. Moreover, this is in contradiction with the idea of invariance proof which purpose is precisely to avoid to reason directly on program executions. We explore an alternative inclusion proof method Hcom ⇒ Scom using an anarchic invariant i.e., an invariant of the anarchic semantics.
Anarchic Invariant
S a inv takes into account all possible communications allowed by the semantics (programmers would say the program logic). The problem is that a general invariant can be of the form "if the communications satisfy given hypotheses then the computations satisfy an invariant property". Obviously this is an invariant of the anarchic semantics but since not all possible communications allowed by the program semantics are characterised by the invariant, this is not an anarchic invariant.
The following Th. 5 shows how to find an anarchic invariant of the anarchic semantics using our proof method with the guarantee that no hypothesis has been made on the communications (but for those disallowed by the semantics as in e.g. [r[] R1 x; R1=R1+1; w[] R1 x] with no feasible execution on Z).
The anarchic semantics S a �P� considers all possible write events W �P�(θq, x), q ∈ Pi ∪ {start}, θq ∈ T(q)
x r-value ∧ v θq ∈ D} and all possible read events R�P�(θp, x), p ∈ Pi, θp ∈ T(p).
The anarchic communications rf ∈ Γ �P� are between matching write and read events for any shared variable x ∈ loc�P�. Example 2 (Thin air 2) Consider the following program monoprocess P. The possible anarchic communications are where v0, v3, and v4 are fresh symbolic variables. Consider the following invariant (including the terms overlined in red).
By the (match) rule at 0 v0 = 0, at 3 v3 = 41, and at 4 v4 = x 1 = 42. It follows that com0 and com3 are false at 3, 4 and 5. By the (satisfaction) rule for the read 1, com 3 where v3 = 41 must hold at 3 and it doesn't so com3 does not hold at 1. Then, by the (read) rule com3 is false at 1 hence, by the (test) rule, com3 is false 6. We get the anarchic inductive invariant S a inv (excluding the infeasible communications of the terms overlined in red which are false according to the program semantics). 
A Proof of PostgreSQL
The PostgreSQL example 1 of Fig. 18 was considered in (Alglave et al. 2013) for bounded bug-finding on a multi-core PowerPC system. We prove, under appropriate hypotheses, the critical section (CS) specification S inv ≜ ¬(at{8} ∧ at{28}) plus non-starvation (CSs are entered infinitely often).
Anarchic Communications of PostgreSQL. The anarchic communications Γ are given in Fig. 18 . We write rf⟨x θ , ⟨ℓ:, θ ′ , v⟩⟩ to state that the read into pythia variable x θ was from an write event marked θ ′ of value v generated by the action at process label ℓ. The markers θ/θ ′ are the vectors of iteration counters of the loops enclosing the read/write instruction. We write Rvp θ for the possible read-froms of variable latchp (v =L) or variable flagp (v =F) in process Pp, p ∈ {0, 1} for unique stamp θ (as encoded by loop counters). All possible cases are considered in Fig. 18 .
All possible communications are obtained by considering that each read of a shared variable in the loops can read from any initial, past or future write to this variable, a different choice being possible at each read. So each Γ ∈ Γ , Γ = {rl0 (Anarchic) Inductive Invariant of PostgreSQL. The inductive invariant Sind is given in Fig. 18 . It depends on Γ encoding a communication rf. Sind assumes that Γ belongs to a unspecified set Γ of possible communications (this dependency is written S ind (Γ, Γ )). So Sind (Γ, Γ ) is valid under the communication hypothesis Scom (Γ, Γ ) ≜ (Γ ∈ Γ ). It follows that Sind (Γ, Γ ) is an inductive anarchic invariant.
Necessary and Sufficient Communication Specification Scom for mutual exclusion. We derive in Fig. 20 the communication specification S com in Fig. 19 by calculational design from the critical section requirements. It follows that (Scom (Γ, Γ ) ∧ Sind (Γ, Γ )) ⇒ Sinv (Γ, Γ ) so S com (Γ, Γ ) ⇒ Sinv (Γ, Γ ) (since Scom (Γ, Γ ) ⇒ Sind (Γ, Γ )), proving mutual exclusion under the S com communication hypothesis.
The proof that Scom (Γ, Γ ) is also necessary is done by providing counter-examples. For example, a candidate execution counterexample to S com 1 is given in Fig. 21 (where the control points of the cut of the traces where the error occurs (i.e., both processes are simultaneously in their critical section) is marked ▶). 
7:
{Γ ∈ Γ ∧ r1Rl0 ℓ ≜ {rf⟨F 1 ℓ , ⟨0:, , 1⟩⟩, rf⟨F 1 ℓ , ⟨28:, ℓ28, 0⟩⟩, rf⟨F 1 ℓ , ⟨9:, i9, 1⟩⟩ | ℓ28 ∈ N ∧ i9 ∈ N} Anarchic communications: Figure 18 : Inductive invariant Sind (Γ, Γ ) of PostgreSQL (under hypothesis Scom (Γ, Γ ) ≜ (Γ ∈ Γ ), Γ ⊆ Γ )
